almost immediately, partly because of objections from psychiatrists, who saw such examining as their preserve, but also because Terman suggested that a better approach would be to test the intelligence of every single recruit.
By January 1919, the ' Army Alpha' test had been administered to 1,726,966 men (Zenderland, 1998, p. 288 ) and on the basis of their scores, psychologists had recommended that 7800 recruits be discharged and another 19,000 be assigned to non-combat units. Although there is no evidence that these recommendations were implemented, psychologists had proved that tests could be administered to a large group of people -and scored -efficiently (Lemann, 1999) .
The same year, two higher education institutions, the University of Ohio and Purdue, used the Army Alpha tests as part of their selection procedures, and by the mid-1920s the use of intelligence tests for student selection was widespread in American universities. One of Robert Yerkes' students, Carl Campbell Brigham, developed a version of the Army Alpha specifically for university admissions, and it was administered to 8026 students in 1926. The test was called the Scholastic Aptitude Test.
Those using the new intelligence tests differed in their views of whether intelligence was innate or could be developed. Many, including Terman, thought that intelligence was fixed and innate. In the early 1920s, Brigham was also firmly in this camp, and in his PhD studies, had sought to show not only was intelligence fixed, but that there were stable differences in intelligence between different racial groups. However, by 1926, he repudiated such ideas:
The term 'scholastic aptitude test' has reference to the type of examination now in current use and variously called 'psychological tests, ' 'intelligence tests, ' 'mental ability tests, ' 'mental alertness tests, ' et cetera. The committee uses the term 'aptitude' to distinguish such tests from tests of training in school subjects. Any claims that aptitude tests now in use really measure 'general intelligence' or 'general ability' may or may not be substantiated. It has, however, been very generally established that high scores in such tests usually indicate ability to do a high order of scholastic work. The term 'scholastic aptitude' makes no stronger claim for such tests than that there is a tendency for individual differences in scores in these tests to be associated positively with individual differences in subsequent academic attainment. (Angier, MacPhail, Rogers, Stone, & Brigham, 1926, p. 1) However, even those who regarded the Scholastic Aptitude Test as measuring developed -rather than innate -abilities did not believe that such tests had much utility for improving learning. Indeed, testing agencies such as the Educational Testing Service have expended considerable effort in seeking to demonstrate that the scores on such tests are relatively insensitive to the effects of instruction (see, for example, Powers & Rock, 1999) . For those who believed that intelligence was innate and fixed, aptitude tests measured something that did not change. Others believed that aptitude tests measured developed abilities, rather than intelligence; for these people, the increases in scores caused by academic study did indicate increased aptitude for higher education, but the tests still simply measured the results of learning, rather than providing any insights into how to improve it. Still others advocated the use of achievement measures, rather than measures of aptitude, for university selection, although it is worth noting that distinguishing aptitude and achievement is more difficult than it might seem. ACT's tests are claimed to be 'measuring what you learn in high school' (ACT, 2017), even though the correlation between scores on ACT and the SAT is around 0.92 (Dorans, 1999) . But even where tests were believed to be measuring achievement, rather than aptitude or intelligence, the tests were not regarded as useful for directing instructional activities.
Such views were also widespread, if not predominant, in psychological testing, partly due no doubt to the focus in mainstream psychology on measuring differences between individuals rather than within the same individual (e.g. by looking at the progress made in learning) (Carver, 1974) . However, there is at least one other reason that the fields of assessment and learning have for many years been fields apart, and that is due to the inherent difficulties of measuring change.
As Ronald Carver pointed out almost half-a-century ago, a test on which students score zero before instruction, and answer every item correctly once they have been taught the relevant material, would be useless from the point of classical test theory:
Psychometric reliability is properly estimated in terms of error variances, product-moment reliability coefficients, and standard errors of measurement. All of these statistics are dependent on variance; if there is no variance then by definition there can be no psychometric reliability. (Carver, 1974, p. 514) As Julian Stanley had pointed out in his chapter on reliability for the second edition of the American Council on Education's edited collection on Educational Measurement (Stanley, 1971) , a test can be highly reliable as a measure of the progress a student has made, but highly unreliable as a measure of the differences between students and vice versa. When, in order to calculate the amount of achievement gain, a less than perfectly reliable score is subtracted from another less than perfectly reliable score, the difference is much less reliable than either of the two original scores. Indeed, in a highly influential article written at that time, Lee Cronbach and Lita Furby had concluded that 'It appears that investigators who ask questions regarding gain scores would ordinarily be better advised to frame their questions in other ways. ' (Cronbach & Furby, 1970, p. 80) From such a perspective, the failure to examine the connection between learning and assessment may seem at least understandable. But over 80 years ago, other psychologists had discovered that not only was learning not separate from the assessment of performance, but that they were inextricably linked, in complex ways.
In the late 1920s, Hugh Carlton Blodgett investigated how quickly rats reached a particular part of a maze depending on whether they were rewarded or not, and the experiments were replicated shortly thereafter by Edward Tolman and Charles Honzik. They found that rats rewarded with food as soon as they reached a goal box within a maze reached the goal box more quickly on subsequent occasions than rats that were simply removed from the maze when they reached the box. The error-rate of those given rewards dropped by 60% over the first ten days of the experiment; those not given rewards also improved, but only around half as quickly, reducing their errors by around 30% over the same period of time. A third group of rats received no reward for the first ten days. As expected, these rats improved at about the same rate as the second group. However when, on the eleventh day, the rats in this third group received rewards for reaching the goal box, their performance the next day was as good as those who had received rewards since the first day. They had been learning, even though the evidence of that learning was not apparent in their performance on the maze task (Blodgett, 1929; Tolman & Honzik, 1930) . Since then many studies have shown that, both for animals and humans, learning can take place without any discernible change in performance, and this seems to hold both for verbal and motor learning (see Soderstrom & Bjork, 2015 , for a review of this research). The converse has also been demonstrated; increases in performance can occur with no increase in long-term learning, and that increases in performance on a learning task can actually be accompanied by reduction in long-term learning.
Even at the level of the individual, therefore, the relationship between learning and assessment is far more complex than is generally assumed. Any study of one without a consideration of the other is bound to produce a partial, and likely misleading, account of what is going on, and how it might be improved. When we consider assessment and learning in their social context, the complexities multiply.
It may be that the complexity of these issues is the main reason that few scholars have, to date, attempted to tackle them. The issues are so complex, and interact at so many levels, that it is far from obvious where the best place to start is, what kinds of theoretical and empirical tools to use, and what would count as success.
But this is why it is so important that Jo-Anne Baird, David Andrich, Therese N. Hopfenbeck, and Gordon Stobart have taken on this challenging, and perhaps impossible task, and begun to make sense of these messy, sprawling fields of scholarship, and suggest ways that we move forward.
Their paper, ' Assessment and learning: fields apart?' forms the focal paper for this special issue of Assessment in Education: Principles, Policy and Practice. Their point of departure is one of the key distinctions Ronald Carver drew between psychometrics and edumetrics; educational assessment is intended to affect the attribute being assessed. Through a rich discussion of constructs, unidimensionality and invariance, they question the whole idea of that educational assessment should, at its root, involve quantification: 'The question, then, is not whether educational attainment exists as quantity in people, but whether attempts at quantifying are useful and predictive' (Baird et al., 2017) .
Turning to the role of theory, Baird et al. review how theories of learning and theories of assessment have influenced each other over the years. As theoretical perspectives of learning have expanded from simple stimulus-response models to constructivist, situated, and sociocultural perspectives, there has been pressure for assessments to change to reflect new views of what happens when learning takes place, and what it means to know something. However, they also point out that there have been influences in the other direction too. The mathematical tractability of the normal distribution, especially in an era before modern computational tools were available, meant that when assessments did not fit the models, it was often the assessment, rather than the model, that had to change. This has often had particularly unfortunate effects because, unlike constructs in psychology, educational constructs are goals. Whereas those focusing on psychological assessment tend to ask, 'Is this correct?' those designing educational assessment have to ask 'Is this good?' In Bent Flyvbjerg's terms, analytic rationality has to give way to value rationality (Flyvbjerg, 2001 ).
Baird et al. then examine the interplay of theories of learning and theories of assessment in two extended case studies: the use of standardised tests to compare student achievement in different countries, and the use of assessment to improve learning. Regarding international comparisons, their conclusion is rather depressing. Despite the huge expenditure of time and effort expended on tests such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), the Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), little has been learned about how to improve educational outcomes for students. However, their analysis of the causes of this failure does provide a set of clear research directions for future work. In particular, an understanding of how issues such as unidimensionality and invariance have been treated within large-scale international comparisons provides some hope that independent analyses of data from these surveys -which seem likely to continue and perhaps expand for the foreseeable future -may actually yield concrete recommendations for the improvement of policy and practice.
The second case study explores what Baird et al. describe as 'the major classroom-based assessment movement of this century' (p. 335). The earliest use of the term ' Assessment for learning' appears to be in the title of a collection of papers edited by Peter Mittler: ' Assessment for learning in the mentally handicapped' (Mittler, 1973) . The phrase was used as the title of a chapter by Harry Black seven years later (Black, 1986) and in a conference paper by Mary James six years after that (James, 1992) . Of course, the idea that assessment could improve teaching, as well as establishing its effects, had been around since the earliest studies of learning and teaching, but was given greater emphasis by Benjamin Bloom (1968) who recommended the use of brief tests used by teachers and students as aids in the learning process. While such tests may be graded and used as part of the judging and classificatory function of evaluation, we see much more effective use of formative evaluation if it is separated from the grading process and used primarily as an aid to teaching. (Bloom, 1969, p. 48) The term 'formative evaluation' had first been proposed by Michael Scriven, who had suggested that evaluation of a curriculum could serve two roles. On the one hand, he pointed out that evaluation 'may have a role in the on-going improvement of the curriculum' (Scriven, 1967, p. 41) . On the other hand, evaluation may serve to enable administrators to decide whether the entire finished curriculum, refined by use of the evaluation process in its first role, represents a sufficiently significant advance on the available alternatives to justify the expense of adoption by a school system. (pp. [41] [42] He proposed 'to use the terms "formative" and "summative" evaluation to qualify evaluation in these roles' (p. 43). While many authors attribute the term 'formative assessment' to Scriven, it seems that he was quite opposed to the idea of applying his distinction in the kinds of roles that evaluation might play to the assessment of individual students (W. J. Popham, personal communication, December 12, 2005).
As Baird et al. point out, many people now regard the terms 'assessment for learning' as synonymous, or at least interchangeable, while others draw more or less sharp distinctions between the two terms. More seriously, there is a profound lack of agreement about what either of these terms mean, which makes both theoretical and empirical progress difficult. For some, a commitment to the use of assessment in support of learning necessarily results in a certain view of what happens when learning takes place (psychology), what it means to know something (epistemology), what students should be learning (curriculum philosophy) and how best to get students to know what we want them to know (pedagogy). For others, while formative assessment may play out differently depending on the views taken, formative assessment is essentially independent of psychology, epistemology, curriculum philosophy, and pedagogy. Baird et al's discussion clarifies some of these issues, and provides useful pointers for how work in this area might move forward.
As well as the deep insights contained in Baird et al's focal paper, this special issue of Assessment in Education includes 13 commentaries from distinguished international scholars, representing a range of research traditions and national contexts.
Six of the commentaries focus on links between the focal paper and what has been done already in the field. Derek Briggs, from the University of Colorado Boulder reviews some of the recent developments in assessment in the United States, particularly the way that the re-authorisation of the 'No Child Left Behind Act' of 2001 has opened the door to a focus on ways of reporting the growth of individual students rather than the increase in achievement in successive cohorts of students. Progression in learning also features strongly in the commentary from James Pellegrino at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Drawing on Lee Cronbach's presidential address to the American Psychological Association (Cronbach, 1957) , he argues that the need to bridge the 'two disciplines of scientific psychology' is as strong today as it was sixty years ago, and that learning progressions represent a potentially powerful way of linking learning and assessment. Alan Schoenfeld, from the University of California Berkeley shows that we already have some promising models of how assessment and learning may be combined in real settings by describing some of the 'formative assessment lesson plans' developed by the Mathematics Assessment Resource Service (MARS) for the Smarter Balanced Assessment Consortium in the United States.
Charles Alderson, Tineke Brunfaut and Luke Harding from the University of Lancaster point out that there are also good working models of how learning and assessment may be combined within the field of language testing, particularly in the assessment of second language learners. They also show that while the definition of educational and psychological constructs pose continuing challenges for the assessment of the traditional school subjects, much progress has been made in this area in language testing, from which those in the school subject testing mainstream might learn.
In his commentary, Harvey Goldstein from the University of Bristol tackles the main issue raised in the focal paper head on. He argues that the whole venture of having theories of learning and theories of assessment informing each other is likely to be fruitless because assessment is in effect just a technology that can have no theoretical basis itself but must be driven by the area to which it is applied: 'It is not that psychometrics is "atheoretical" that is the problem, rather that psychometricians seek to dress up what they do as "theory"' (p. 389).
In my own commentary on the focal paper, I raise a different, but I believe important, issue in the use of theories of assessment to improve learning, and that is that there is a real danger that we assume that the stages through which a learner progresses are, in some way, related to levels of performance at the completion of a sequence of learning. This may, of course be true, but there are numerous examples where practising a particular skill is not the best way to improve performance of that skill -there may be times, therefore, when theories of assessment may need to be kept away from theories of learning.
The next three commentaries highlight some of the main priorities that need attention if we are to help assessment and learning support each other. Mary James from the University of Cambridge outlines some of the benefits, and also some of the challenges, involved in sociocultural approaches to learning and assessment. In particular, she explores how to think about issue of generalisability where assessment activities are embedded in real-life contexts. Patricia Broadfoot, from the University of Bristol, highlights two key areas that are likely to be extremely important in improving assessment and learning -technology, and the social and emotional aspects of learning. The rapidly expanding field of data analytics is generating important insights into how to gain insights into large, complex data-sets, but of course, such insights come with dangers, such as having assessment intrude into every aspect of a student's work. And while we have made much progress in understanding the role of social and emotional aspects of learning, we have much to learn in using these effectively to improve education.
Lauren Resnick, from the University of Pittsburgh, draws lessons from the experience of the United States over the last century. She concludes that progress will depend on ensuring that psychometrics follows, rather than leads, educational practice. Since psychometrics is concerned primarily with comparing performances, rather than creating them, only by explicitly requiring those who design assessment to start from good educational practices, and find dependable ways of evaluating them, will we make progress.
As if all these issues weren't complex enough, two of the commentaries highlight the fact that the way that assessment is used in our societies inevitably entails issues of power. As Cleo Cherryholmes (1988) points out, 'Constructs and the discourses and practices within which they occur are objects of history. ' (p. 438) . Psychometricians and educators may well agree how to define constructs, and develop assessments that operationalise those constructs in ways that are beneficial to learning, but when the results of assessments are used to reward some, and deny opportunities to others, can those who design and administer these assessment deny responsibility for their consequences?
Constructs and their validation represent effects of power and the exercise of power. I use power to refer to asymmetries or differences in possessions or characteristics by which some people are indulged and rewarded and others are deprived and penalized. Power is constituted by relationships among these asymmetries or differences. (Cherryholmes, 1988, p. 438) María Teresa Flórez Petour, from the University of Chile, reminds us that there is no such thing as a 'view from nowhere ' (Nagel, 1989) . There are no ideologically and politically neutral assessments. How we think about learning and about assessment is inevitably constrained by our experiences, and the social positions we occupy. If we do not examine the political and ideological underpinnings of our assessments, we will never understand how the choices we make can rule out alternative perspectives and theories.
In his commentary, Denny Borsboom, from the University of Amsterdam, also tackles issues of power. He suggests that the invention of the psychological test may be the most important invention in the history of psychology. Assumptions about issues such as unidimensionality and invariance have profound consequences for how students are assessed, who is successful and who is not. Moreover, when assessment results are used in meritocratic cultures, those assumptions have consequences that are literally life-changing.
The last two commentaries tackle some technical issues in assessment that may provide concrete ways for moving forward. Michael Kane, from the Educational Testing Service, in Princeton, New Jersey, suggests that many of the technical constraints on assessments that assessment developers feel bound by may not be necessary. While some writers have argued that to become 'respectable' , educational measurement should adopt the axioms for physical measurement developed by Otto Hölder over a century ago (Hölder, 1901 (Hölder, /1996 , Kane suggests that this is a counsel of perfection, and that many of these assumptions are not only unnecessary, but unwise. If the design principles of our assessments are based on how they will be used, taking into account the inferences and actions we need them to support, then we have much more freedom for manoeuvre than might be apparent.
Alex Scharaschkin from AQA (formerly the Assessment and Qualifications Alliance, and England's largest public examination board) provides a different, but equally valuable, perspective on the design of educational assessments by suggesting that the content of a subject domain, such as ' Advanced level mathematics' together with associated assessment objectives (in essence explicit statements of construct-relevant attributes) create value concepts. The advantage of such a formulation is that treating educational constructs as structured networks of value concepts does not require us to treat educational assessment as measurement at all, and would thus allow assessment to value the attainment displayed in the assessment directly, rather than via some hypothesised latent trait (such as 'mathematical ability') or the particular features used by judges in comparative judgement scoring.
For most of history, to be assessed -to have one's capabilities formally evaluated and documented -was rare. As Michel Foucault writes in Discipline and punish (Foucault, 1977) :
For a long time ordinary individuality -the everyday individuality of everybody -remained below the threshold of description. To be looked at, observed, described in detail, followed from day to day by an uninterrupted writing was a privilege. (p. 191) Today, for better or worse, just about everyone is documented and assessed. The challenge is to ensure that these necessary and inevitable processes of assessment support learning rather than hinder it. The challenges are ferociously difficult, and progress will be slow, but the contributions in this special issue represent, in my view, several strong strides in the right direction.
In closing, I would like to record my thanks to Joanne Hazell and Natalie Usher from the University of Oxford, who have supported myself and Jo-Anne Baird in editing this special issue. Without their contributions, this issue would probably never have reached a state that would merit publication, let alone be as good as it is.
